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THE CODE OF HAMMURAPI-THE
OLDEST KNOWN LEGAL CODE
By Frank L. Fetzer of the Denver Bar

AMMURAPI, the powerful King of Babylon, the sixteenth king of Larsa, the sixth of his dynasty in Babylon
(the date of his rule being variously given by authorities as a period of about fifty years sometime between 2250
B. C. to 2050 B. C., the period nearer the former date being
considered more accurate), came to the throne following a
century of warfare. During the first years of his reign he
was engaged as a great soldier in reducing the country surrounding Babylon to submission, destroying all of his enemies
to the north and to the south. He made the little town of
Babylon supreme throughout the land, and due to its power
and influence the land was known as "Babylonia". When his
sovereignty was generally acknowledged through a wide dominion, he was free during the last twelve years of his life
to cement together the various parts of his kingdom. He was
the first great organizer to appear in the Euphrates Valley
and was the ablest of his line. He accomplished a great deal
in regard to internal development, such as improving the
water supply and constructing and regulating irrigation systems. He left to ancient centers their religious importance,
while divesting them of political prerogatives. He consolidated the warring factions of the valley and welded them into
a kingdom.
Hammurapi became the great law giver of Babylonia
and his promulgation of laws and of the Hammurapi Code is
his greatest achievement. His reign reduced the inherited kingdom to order by instituting laws regulating the conduct of his
people. As conquered towns and their adjacent districts were
brought into his realm, his laws were set over them and they
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aided vitally in welding the whole into a unit. He made his
people dwell in peace and security. With full understanding
of every part of his dominion, alert, vigorous, full of decision
and with a profound sense of justice, the great king saw the
necessity of making uniform all the various and sometimes
conflicting laws and customs of the land. He collected all the
older written laws and usages of business and social life and
arranged them systematically. Many of the laws in the code
were taken directly from an older Sumerian code. The code
not only reflects the laws and customs of his generation but
the time-sanctioned customs of a thousand years before. Some
of them he improved and he added some new laws where his
own judgment deemed it wise and then combined them into
the code known as the Code of Hammurapi comprising 282
sections, which have been translated. It was written not in
Sumerian, as some of the old laws were, but in the Semitic
speech of the Akadians and Amorites. He then had it engraved upon a stone shaft of black diorite, which is a very hard
stone, and set up in the temple of the great god, Marduc, in
Babylon. The code was copied in clay tablets and engraved
on other stones and used by the judges throughout the empire.
The code was copied and studied for 1500 years and the greater
part of it remained in force even through the Persian, Greek
and Parthian conquests which affected private life in Babylonia very little, and it survived to influence Syro-Roman and
later Mohammedan law in Mesopotamia.
The monument on which the code is engraved, was found
in December, 1901, on the acropolis of Susa by an expedition
sent out by the French Government under Director General,
M. de Morgan. This black diorite shaft is nearly eight feet
high and broken into three pieces, which were easily rejoined.
It stands on a stone pedestal in one of the side rooms in The
Louvre at Paris. The characters are deeply cut and plainly
visible. Impressions are easily made and copies have been
sent to scholars over the world. Some minor changes have
been made, but the translations by various scholars, for the
most part agree. On the obverse side there is a bas relief exhibiting King Hammurapi receiving the laws from the sun
god. Under this relief are engraved sixteen columns of text,
four and one-half of which form a prologue. There were
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originally five more columns on the obverse side but these
have been cut off by the Elamitic conqueror. On the reverse
side there are twenty-eight columns, the last five of which form
the, epilogue.
The code of Hammurapi is the earliest known code of
laws. What the laws of Moses were to the Hebrews, the laws
of Lycurgus to Sparta, the laws of Solon to Attica, the Laws
of the Twelve Tables (451 and 450 B. C.) were to the early
Romans, the Code of Hammurapi was to the Babylonian
Empire. The code insists on justice to the widow, the orphan
and the poor, that the strong might not oppress the weak, the
righting of wrong, and uplifts woman in her social and legal
position. It gives her separate rights in property, rights of
inheritance to her children, recognizes marriage only by ceremony and contract, and protects her in respect to divorce and
maintenance. Indeed, the position of women in this early
Babylonian world, as in Egypt, was high, free and dignified.
The code reveals society marching from the primitive
stage of retaliation to one more advanced where money can
be substituted for damage or injury. Where the injury befell
one of noble or exalted position, retaliation was the method
of redress, but where one in humble station was involved,
money could be paid as compensation for the loss inflicted.
The laws show a strong disposition towards protection of
women both as regards divorce and business rights.
The laws promulgated in the code fall generally into
classifications as the laws of other codes and of laws in general, such as sovereignty, crimes, private wrongs, property,
domestic relations, including master and servant and divorce,
personal injuries, with contracts, bailments, agency and procedure.
The code recognized legally the three existing classes
of society:
(1) Amelu, or householders, property owners, the
wealthy professions, craftsmen and upper classes, the
patrician class;
(2) The muskinu, or possibly plebeian class, poor men,
serfs, (difficult to exactly define).
(3) The ardu, male and female slaves, and their rights
and privileges, were clearly defined.
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The king is a benevolent autocrat, easily accessible to
all of his subjects, both able and willing to protect the weak
against the high-placed oppressor. The royal power, however, can only pardon when private resentment is appeased.
Injustice too often resulted, for some of the laws exacted
the life of a man's son for his causing the death of another's
son.
The temple occupied a most important position. It received vast amounts of all sorts of naturalia besides money
and gifts. The larger temples had many officials and servants.
Originally each town clustered around one temple. The temple had numerous responsibilities, among which were to ransom one of its citizens if he were unable to do so, to lend seed
or supplies without interest. Stress was laid upon the universal habit of writing and perpetual recourse was had to written
contracts, deeds, receipts and bonds. Great freedom was allowed in making contracts. Every transaction from betrothal
to the purchase of sheep had to be recorded in writing and
duly witnessed. In many cases unless this preliminary had
been regularly made, no claim for justice would be entertained. In the absence of writing great weight was attached
to oaths and the penalties for false oaths and dishonesty were
severe.
To falsely swear as a witness in a trial or fail to establish
the statement one has made, was punishable by death if the
case were a capital offense trial. To bear false witness in a
civil case was punishable by the same damages as would result
in that suit. Crimes punishable by death were numerous and
included the following: to steal goods from a temple or house;
to purchase or receive on deposit from a minor or slave, silver,
gold, male or female slave or domestic animals, except by
consent of elders; kidnapping; inducing a male or female
slave from the house of another or to leave the city; detaining
a slave; breaking into a house, in which event he should be
killed before the breach made in the house and there buried;
highway robbery; taking the property of one whose house is
burning, the thief to be cast into the self-same fire; a builder
whose house fell and caused the death of the owner, should be
put to death and if the owner's son was killed, the builder's
son should be put to death; bringing about the death of her
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husband for the sake of another man; falsely claiming property to be lost; to hire another to perform the errand when
ordered on an errand of the king; to cause the death by
neglect or abuse of one seized for debt; adultery was punishable by the death of both parties; forcing cohabitation with
a virgin fiancee of another living in her father's house.
The state assumed the responsibility for the protection of
its people and in the event a highwayman was not caught, the
man robbed stated on oath what he had lost and the city or
district governor was required to restore to him what he had
lost. Travel was safe. One returning to the owner a runaway
slave in the open field-the owner was required to pay him
two shekels of silver.
The god of a city originally was owner of its land, which
encircled it with an inner ring of irrigable land and an outer
ring of pasture, and the citizens were his tenants. The code
recognizes complete private ownership of land, but all land
was sold subject to its fixed charges, such as men for the army,
dues in kind. The land could be freed from its fixed charges
by charter from the king. Ancestral estate was strictly tied
to the family. The code recognizes many ways of dealing
with property-sale, lease, barter, gift, dedication, deposit,
loan, pledge, all of which were matters of contract. Landowners frequently cultivated their land themselves, but might
employ husbandmen or let it. One renting a field and failing
to cultivate it, was held responsible for not doing the work
and should pay the average rent, but one unable to tend his
own field, had the privilege of having another attend to the
field. If one's field was flooded by storm or affected by
drought, he was relieved from paying his creditor and relieved from interest during that year. Houses were let usually
for the year, but also ior longer terms, rent being paid semiannually in advance, but subject to terms of the contract.
Irrigation was indispensable. One not keepling his dike
of sufficient strength to withhold the impounded waters, was
liable for the overflow of neighbor's land caused by a breach
in the dike, and if he was not able to restore his neighbor's
crops, his property should be sold and the one injured should
share in the money or he be sold with his family to pay the
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cost. He was also liable if he allowed his irrigating water
to flood his neighbor's field.
Two-thirds of the produce of the garden went to the
landlord, but the landlord furnished all equipment and materials, fodder for the cattle and rations for the workmen.
A gardener failing to till the garden should pay the average
rent.
An agent receiving money as a speculation from a merchant and losing it in his travels, was obliged to return the
full sum to the merchant. If the agent in his travels on caravan was forced to give up some of the goods he was carrying,
by stating under oath the amount so lost, he was acquitted to
that extent. The agent was required to give the merchant a
statement in writing sealed as areceipt for what he received
from the merchant. Regulations in respect to deposit of
grain in granaries between the warehouseman and depositor,
were strict and penalties attached by losing all of the deposit
or being compelled to return double the amount should any
of the goods be mishandled.
A woman was not a man's wife unless the marriage contract was executed. The contract usually stated the consequences to which each party was liable for repudiating the
other. Monogamy was the rule, but a childless wife might
give her husband a maid who was not a wife to bear him
children in which event the husband was not permitted to
take a concubine. A concubine was a wife, but not of the
same rank, and her children were legitimate., If a man
divorced his wife who had not borne him children, he should
pay to her as much as was given her as her bride price and
the marriage portion which she brought from her father's
house, and could then divorce her. If the man's wife became
diseased while married, he was permitted to take a second
wife but was required to maintain the first wife in their home
as long as she lived. If the first wife was not willing to stay
in the same house, the husband was required to pay her the
marriage portion which she brought from her father's house
and then she could go. A father had no claim to the marriage
portion of a deceased wife who had borne children, and the
marriage portion passed to her children. If the wife were
at fault, the husband could send her away while he kept the
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children and her dowry or he could degrade her to the position of a slave in his own household. The wife could bring
an action for cruelty and neglect and secure a separation,
taking with her her dowry, but no other punishment fell upon
the husband. If she did not prove her case and was proved
to be a bad wife, she was drowned. If she were left without
maintenance during her husband's involuntary absence (such
as in military service) she could cohabit with another man,
but must return to her husband if he came back, the children
of the second union remaining with their own father. As a
widow, she took her husband's place in the family, living in
his household and bringing up the children. A widow could
only remarry with judicial consent, in which event the estate
was inventoried by the judge and given to her and her new
husband in trust for the children.
A father tiad control over his children until they were
married. Advancements to children were not deducted from
the children's share of an inheritance but each child should
inherit in addition to the gifts made by the father. Apprenticeship and adoption of children were dealt with quite similarly to our own common law. No claim was made against
a foster child of the father whom the father had brought up.
A child brought up as an apprentice could not be reclaimed.
Disinheritance of children was prohibited except by judicial
consent and then only for repeated unfilial conduct.
Retaliation in part of the criminal law remained as a
ruling principle, as will be seen in the following illustrations: one knocking out the eye of a patrician should lose
an eye; a broken limb was the penalty for breaking th limb
of a patrician; a tooth for a tooth; cutting off the hand that
struck a father or stole a trust; cutting off the breast of a wet
nurse who substituted a child for the one entrusted to her; the
loss of tongue that denied father or mother; the loss of a surgeon's hand which caused loss of life or limb or the brander's
hand which obliterated a slave's identification mark, which
was generally tattooed or branded; loss of a slave's ear for
striking a free man or denying his master; branding on the
forehead for falsely pointing the finger at a priestess or the
wife of another.
The tooth of a plebeian was paid for by one-third of a
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mina of silver (which we notice in comparison to one-half
of a mina of silver for wrongfully cutting down a tree in a
neighbor's orchard). The surgeon operating with a bronze
lancet on a patrician for a serious injury resulting in a cure,
was paid ten shekels of silver by the patrician, whereas a
plebeian paid five shekels.
A builder must make his boat sound and if it is found
during the first year not to be sound, the boatman must repair
the boat or give a strong boat to the owner.
One who hired a domestic animal which was killed by a
lion or lightning in an open field, was not responsible for the
loss and the loss fell upon the owner. If a herdsman was
careless, he was required to make good the loss to the owner.
Frequent disputes seem to have prompted a fixed amount
of damages in many instances. To cut down a neighbor's tree
without his consent required the payment of half a mina of
silver. Debt was secured on the person of the debtor, but
he could by contract pledge his field, crop, house or other
property. Distraint on the debtor's corn was prohibited.
Personal guarantees for others were often given. Pay through
a banker or by written draft against deposit was frequent.
Bonds to pay were treated as negotiable. The code regulated
the liquor traffic and fixed a fair price for beer.
There is no trace of professional advocates and the plaintiff preferred his own plea in writing. The judge examined
the plea, called the other parties and sent for witnesses. Postponements were allowed. Important cases, especially those
involving life and death, were tried by a bench of judges.
The code recognized the importance of intention. Associated
with the judges were elders who shared in the decisions. Less
important cases were heard by one judge and twelve elders.
Parties and witnesses were put on oath but great stress was
put on written evidence. The loss of writing was serious.
Decisions were in writing, sealed and witnessed, a copy for
each party and one for the archives. Parties swore to observe
the stipulations in the decree. The judges were strictly supervised. Appeal to the king was allowed, but if the code gave
the rule in the case, the action was remanded with instructions
to enter judgment according to the code.

OUR ELEVENTH CHIEF JUSTICE
By Allen Moore of the Denver Bar

HEN the news of the resignation of Chief Justice
William Howard Taft was announced to the public
on February 3, 1930, because of the serious illness
which later resulted in his death on March 8th, there came
with startling suddenness the news that President Hoover had
forwarded to the Senate, within four hours, the appointment
of Charles Evans Hughes to fill the vacancy thus created, but
since it met with country-wide acclamation no one thought
that it would meet with any particular objection in the Senate.
Seldom has a President acted upon so grave an appointment
with such speed. Thereupon, the appointment was referred
to the Judiciary Committee of the Senate and on February
10th that committee, through Senator Norris, its Chairman,
favorably reported the nomination and Senator Watson asked
for unanimous consent for its immediate consideration. Objections were made by Mr. Blease of South Carolina, and
thereupon followed on four successive days a fight on Mr.
Hughes' confirmation which gained great momentum and
attracted the attention of the whole country and has been
referred to variously, as "The Hughes Rebellion" and "The
Fight on the Supreme Court". Stainless in his personal reputation, distinguished for intellectual stature, with a fine record
for public service and a world-wide eminence as a statesman
and jurist, he was formidably challenged by Senator after
Senator as lacking the supreme qualification of judicial impartiality, as being, on the contrary, the outstanding representative of legal, economic and social reaction and as the foremost champion of property rights versus human rights and
as lacking in sensibility in accepting appointment to the Court
from which he had once seen fit to resign to become a candidate for the Presidency. The newspapers and periodicals
throughout the country became interested in the confirmation
fight and the echoes of it will be long in fading away.
Editorial comment in opposition to the Hughes appointment in the Senate called attention to the fact of the changing
character of the cases and controversies coming before the
Supreme Court for consideration. It was pointed out that
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whereas, aside from the major cases broadly interpretative of
the Constitution, the mass of the cases in its early history were
of minor importance, that by 1925 nearly half of the cases
concerned the control of economic enterprise, taxation, adjustment among the states, anti-trust cases and cases arising
under the commerce and due process clauses of the Constitution and under the 14th Amendment. In that year, 1925, an
Act was passed amending the Judicial Code and defining the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals and of the Supreme Court (Act of February 13, 1925) which relieved the
Supreme Court of ordinary common law and statutory cases
altogether and confined its province exclusively to relationships among the various governmental units of our federal
system and the relationship between the individual and the
State or National Government. Its function is now mainly
that of interpreting the Constitution. The Court is more and
more considering the meaning in particular controversies of
words such as "life," "liberty," "property," "regulate commerce ... among the several states," "privilege and immunities of citizens," "due process of law," and "equal protection of
the law." More and more the Supreme Court is becoming
a supreme policy-making body, a Curia Regis, as it were,
which differs from our other branches of government chiefly
in that its nine members hold their appointive positions for
life and are, therefore, not responsible directly to public
opinion.
Appointments to the Supreme Court, by reason of these
changes, are of increasing and transcendental importance and
the responsibility of the President is consequently all the more
grave.
It is urged by the more liberally minded that the Court
has shown a distinct bias in judgment on contentious social
and economic questions, a bias from which its own minority,
consisting largely of the same Justices in each case, viz.,
Holmes, Brandeis and Stone, has consistently dissented. The
two groups in the Supreme Court represent more fundamentally divergent social philosophies and attitudes of mind, conservative and liberal, than do the two major political parties
in Congress.
Through a line of decisions growing ever more severe,
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it is submitted, the majority of the Supreme Court has limited the ability of organized labor not merely to exert its influence, but to protect its very existence. In the Hitchman
Case, Hitchman Coal, etc., Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229,
it validated the "yellow dog contract" in a way which made
illegal the attempt to organize workers who have been forced,
as a condition of employment, to sign away their rights to
join a Union. In Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, it declared that a state could not pass a valid law prohibiting the
use of the injunction in labor disputes. It has, in the Duplex
Printing and the Bedford Stone Cutters cases, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, Bedford Cut Stone
Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Association, 274 U. S. 677,
denied the right of Unions to refuse to work on materials made
by non-union labor, if these materials were shipped in interstate commerce. It has denied the right of Congress to pass
child-labor laws, Hammer v. Dagenhart,247 U. S. 251, Bailey
v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, and of the states to
enforce mandatory minimum wage laws, Adkins v. Childrens
Hospital, 261 U. S. 525. At the same time it has enlarged
the scope of organized capital by applying the "rule of reason" in numerous anti-trust cases.
It is also urged by adherents of these views of the activities of the Court that it has denied the right of the public to
regulate public utilities by numerous specific rulings and has
continually enforced higher valuations; that it substituted its
own judgment for that of the expert Interstate Commerce
Commission in the O'Fallon Case, St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry.
Co. v. United States, 49 Sup. Ct. 385, and by its decision in
the case of United Railway and Electrical Company v. West,
et al, decided January 6, 1930, it has required the citizens of
Baltimore to pay tramway car fares sufficient to return 8 per
cent on a valuation based upon present cost of reproduction
and has included in the assets of the Company its franchise
to operate at a valuation of $5,000,000.00. All of these tendencies are cited as examples of the changing economics of
the Supreme Court.
If these tendencies are correctly interpreted there should
be a scrupulous examination of nominees to the Court and
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constant and unrelenting criticism of its decisions, rather than
considering it a sacrosanct retreat of abstract justice.
Below a brief account will be given of the debate which
took place in the Senate prior to Mr. Hughes confirmation
by that body on February 13, 1930, and his induction into
office February 24, 1930. As stated above, objection was made
to unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the
nomination when it was reported to the Senate, by the Judiciary Committee Chairman, Mr. Norris, on February 10th.
Mr. Norris then made a preliminary address concerning the
nomination although it was not before that body at that time.
He objected to Mr. Hughes' confirmation at that time principally on two grounds. First, that Mr. Hughes had resigned
from the Supreme Court to become a candidate for the Presidency of the United States; that he had left that high judicial
tribunal to enter the arena of partisan political debate and
after his ambitions in the political field had failed of realization he should not be reappointed to the Supreme Court and
particularly not be promoted to the position of Chief Justice.
Second, that we had reached a time in our history when the
power and influence of monopoly and organized wealth are
reaching into every governmental activity; that combinations
and mergers are of every-day occurrence, extending to every
line of business and commercial enterprise, there never having
been a time in the history of our country when combined
wealth has wielded as great an influence in the commercial
and political world as is being wielded at the present time;
that no man in public life so exemplifies the influence of powerful combinations in the political and financial world as does
Mr. Hughes; that almost invariably he has represented corporations of. almost untold wealth; that because of the supposed influence which he might exert upon the Supreme
Court, he was enabled to charge almost unlimited fees for
his services; that during his active practice, he has been associated with men of immense wealth and lived in an atmosphere
of luxury which can only come from immense fortunes and
great combinations and that therefore his viewpoint is clouded
and his decisions would be all in favor of big business. All of
these things, Mr. Norris thought, disqualified Mr. Hughes
to serve again upon the Supreme Court.
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On the following day, February I 1th, the Tariff debate
was interrupted to consider Mr. Hughes' nomination. Mr.
Borah thereupon led the attack. His line of argument against
Mr. Hughes' confirmation was that the Supreme Court is
more and more engaged in the consideration of public utility
valuation cases and rate cases; that in the Supreme Court
there are two distinct legal and economic view points, represented on the one side by the majority of the court, and on the
other, for the most part, by Justices Holmes, Brandeis and
Stone. Mr. Borah conceded that Mr. Hughes is a man of
high standing, one of the distinguished Americans of the day,
a man of wide reputation and acknowledged ability. Without
any reflection upon his integrity, he submitted that a Chief
Justice should not be placed upon the Supreme Court who
held the legal and economic views which Mr. Hughes holds,
with respect to property rights as opposed to personal rights.
He raised the point that Mr. Hughes had appeared in
the Newberry case, wherein Newberry, as candidate for the
Senate from the State of Michigan, was charged in an indictment with the criminal offense of having violated the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act, and was afterwards convicted. In that
case Mr. Hughes contended before the Supreme Court that
the Congress of the United States had no control, no power
of the original sources of activity which would result in the
selection of a Senator of the United States. His contention
was that the Federal Government was without power to protest against corruption on the part of those who were seeking
nomination at the hands of the people for a place in the Senate
of the United States. Mr. Borah called the attention of the
Senate to the fact that Mr. Hughes had served as attorney
for the American Petroleum Institute; that he had appeared
for the Interborough Company of New York in its effort to
collect increased fares; that he had appeared for the Meat
Packers in an attempt on their part to modify the decree
which had been entered against them; that he had appeared
for the American Jersey Pottery Company when it was
charged with a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, and
likewise for the American Malleable Castings Iron Company
charged with violating the same law. Mr. Blease of South
Carolina thereupon called the attention of the Senate to the
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fact that this is only the second time that a Justice of the
Supreme Court, who had resigned, was appointed Chief Justice of the United States, but that in the previous case of
Mr. Rutledge, after serving six months as such, his appointment was not confirmed.
Following this, Mr. Glass of Virginia, expressed his opposition to the confirmation of Mr. Hughes, first, upon his
lack of sensibility, that is, that a person who had once served
upon the Supreme Court and who had resigned to become a
candidate for a political office should not again accept the
appointment upon that court; and, second, because of the decision of the court in the famous Shreveport case, the opinion
in which was written by Mr. Hughes. Mr. Glass felt that
in the Shreveport decision every right that a state had possessed of control of intrastate traffic was literally stripped
from it, and since that decision, the Interstate Commerce
Commission has reached out time and time again and arrogated to itself necessary powers, in, one instance at least which
the Congress of the United States itself does not possess. In
the progress of the debate which followed, Mr. Wagner and
Mr. Copeland, Senators from New York and both Democrats,
came to Mr. Hughes defense, as did Mr. Gillett, Republican
of Massachusetts.
On February 12th and 13th, the debate on the confirmation of Mr. Hughes continued, led by Dill of Washington,
Brookhart of Iowa, Wheeler of Montana, La Follette of
Wisconsin, Nye of North Dakota, and again by Senator Norris
and others. The principal defense of Mr. Hughes was made
by Senator Glenn of Illinois who in a masterful characterization of Mr. Hughes as a lawyer, statesman and jurist, gave
a justification of his legal and economic views. Randell of
Louisiana and Shortridge of California also spoke in his defense. The opposition gained momentum as the fight progressed, but the proponents of Mr. Hughes had the necessary
votes and were not greatly worried, remaining confident
throughout the debate.
In addition to the points raised in opposition to Mr.
Hughes, previously mentioned, the broad question of the right
of the Supreme Court to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional was discussed as being a usurpation of power on the
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part of the Court; Mr. Hughes' contention in the case of
Federal Radio Commission, v. General Electric Company,

280 U. S. (preliminary print) 17A, that the great Radio Corporations of America had a vested right in perpetuity to
channels of communication through the air because of priority of appropriation, was viewed with alarm; the decision
of the Court in the Baltimore Tramway Case decided January
6, 1930, deciding that, "It is a settled rule of this Court that
the rate base is present value, and it would be wholly illogical
not to adopt this for depreciation," was cited as the most
extreme case in public utility valuation; and it was also urged
that Mr. Hughes being the oldest man ever to be appointed
to the Court was too old to accept the position.
The vote was taken late in the day on February 13th, resulting in 52 for confirmation and 26 against, with 18 not voting. Altogether, the debate was kept upon a fairly high
plane. Mr. Hughes' whole public life was submitted to the
closest scrutiny and criticism, but all conceded his high character, honesty and personal integrity. Yet as stated earlier in
this article, it'served to focus the attention of the Nation on
the attitude of some members of the Senate at least, toward the
Supreme Court and to cause much editorial comment of the
same general nature throughout the country.
In view of the interest aroused by the appointment of
Mr. Hughes to the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States it may be opportune once more
to review his life and character, his experience upon the Supreme Court, as Secretary of State and as a member of the
World Court.
It is stated that one day when Mr. Hughes was Secretary
of State a group of neophytes in the consular service filed into
his~outer office to get a word of inspiration from their Chief,
for the careers upon which they were about to embark. Mr.
Hughes told them, "The man who succeeds in his work in
any position where there are a great many burdens and demands is the man who can keep his head and intelligence, at
the same time giving the impression of a man adequate to the
exigency." This expression, "adequate to the exigency," very
aptly characterizes Mr. Hughes himself. He has ever been
"adequate to the exigency."
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What an amazing record we have in Mr. Hughes' career!
At the age of 44 we find him Governor of the great State of
New York, serving two terms; at the age of 48 he becomes
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, serving
with distinction for a period of six years; at 54, he resigns
from the Supreme Court to accept the Republican nomination for the Presidency, and after an ill-omened campaign
marching to its extraordinary conclusion on the night when
Mr. Hughes went to bed thinking himself President-elect, he
awakes the next morning to find himself a private citizen;
then follows a period of remunerative practice at the Bar,
after which, at the age of 59, he becomes Secretary of State
of the United States; then he serves at the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armaments, and at the Conference of the American Republics meeting at Havana last year;
then follows a period of private practice interspersed with
distinguished service and his duties as a Judge of the
Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, and
now, .at the age of 68, the Eleventh Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States!
Charles Evans Hughes was born at Glen Falls, New
York, April 11, 1862, the son of Reverend David Charles and
Mary Catherine (Connelly) Hughes. His father was a Baptist minister, and the effects of the training which that implies
may readily be seen in the life of the distinguished son. He
entered Colgate university at the age of 14 and from 1876
to 1878 he attended there. He received his A.B. degree at
Brown University in 1881, and the A.M. degree in 1884, from
the same school. He went to New York in 1882 and began
the study of law, in the office of General Stewart L. Woodford
and at Columbia Law School, graduating in 1884 and being
admitted to the Bar the same year. He won the Prize Fellowship at Columbia Law School and was a Fellow there from
1884 to 1887.
After his admission to the Bar, he became a clerk, from
1884 to 1891, in the office of Chamberlain, Carter & -Hornblower of New York City, which was a notable corporation
firm. It is said that more than 100 distinguished lawyers have
served in that office. During 1891-93 he was Professor of Law
at Cornell University and special lecturer at New York Uni-
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versity Law School from 1893 to 1900. In 1888 he had married Antoinette Carter, the daughter of the senior member of
the firm. Four children were born of this marriage and it is
interesting to note that Charles Evans Hughes, Jr., became
Solicitor-General of the United States, resigning that office
upon the appointment of his father to the Supreme Court as
Chief Justice.
Mr. Hughes' career then expanded rapidly. For the next
ten years he applied himself diligently to a study of the history,
philosophy and practice of the law. He was a precise, methodically-minded man, extremely careful with the proprieties, never disposed to break the conventions, studying the law
and law systems as he found them. The firm was known as
Carter, Hughes & Cravath from 1887 to 1891 and Carter,
Hughes & Dwight from 1893 to 1904.
Until 1904, Mr. Hughes was perfecting himself in the
knowledge of corporation and general law, serving on many
important cases with such distinguished men as James
Coolidge Carter and Joseph Hodges Choate, but up to that
time he was comparatively unknown to the general public.
He first attracted popular notice in his capacity as counsel
for the Stevens Gas Commission, a legislative committee of
New York state which was appointed to investigate the price
of gas. The result of this committee's findings was the passage
of the law fixing the rate for gas in New York City. Afterwards this law was long contested, but its constitutionality
was finally upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In 190S, the great insurance scandal broke and the New
York Legislature appointed the Armstrong Insurance Commission, and Mr. Hughes, who was already becoming an
authority on insurance law, was chosen as the Committee's
Council. His admirable conduct of this case brought his
name before the general public and brought him rapidly to
the attention of the country, as he displayed uncommon skill
and proficiency in unearthing certain parts of the vast system
of insurance corruption through which the directors, brokers,
promoters, syndicates of magnates and retainers, members of
companies, lobbyists, and politicians enriched themselves at
the expense of the policyholders. Point after point he patiently brought out as to the involved and concealed circum-
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stances of the long continued loot and corruption. Reputations of many men long acclaimed for their respectability
were blasted, and others were ruined by these revelations. Mr.
Hughes' masterful handling of the great array of facts and
his splendid and fearless cross-examination of witnesses day
after day was the marvel of the profession. For at least two
months he subjected Thomas F. Ryan to the most merciless
cross-examination.
In 1905 he declined the Republican nomination for the
office of Mayor of New York City and in 1906 he served as
special assistant to the Attorney-General of the United States
in the coal investigation, but his handling of the insurance investigation had brought him before the public to the extent
that he could not resist accepting the nomination for Governor
of New York for the Republican party, and in 1906 was elected to the office, defeating his formidable opponent, William
Randolph Hearst, and serving from January 1, 1907, to October 6, 1910.
The administration of Governor Hughes was an unceasing fight for reform. In his first message to the Legislature
he recommended, among other things, a Public Service Commission law, extension of the Corrupt Practices Act, the Massachusetts ballot, direct primaries, laws for the protection of
women and children in factories, pure food and election laws.
The Public Service Commission Law was passed and the suggestions for labor laws were carried out but the remainder
of the program was defeated. The Direct Primary Bill was
defeated after a long struggle. The Governor carried the
matter to the people in several public addresses and called
an extraordinary session for a reconsideration of the bill but
it was again defeated. Finally, in 1913 under the administration of Governor Glynn, the Short Ballot Act was passed.
Race-track gambling was made unlawful in 1908. On the
whole, the administration of Governor Hughes was impartial
and progressive and won the approval of a majority of the
people of the State and his national reputation was greatly
enhanced.
In April, 1910, by a strange coincidence, William
Howard Taft, then President of the United States and now
Mr. Hughes' predecessor in the office of Chief Justice of the
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United States Supreme Court, appointed Mr. Hughes as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. The Senate acted
favorably on his appointment May 2, and on October 10, 1910,
he took office. For a period of almost six years he served with
distinction on the Supreme Bench-the nature and character
of his decisions will be discussed later in this article.
In 1908 he was the choice of the majority of the NewYork
delegation to the Republican National Convention but sufficient strength could not be obtained to secure his nomination.
Mr. Hughes was suggested as nominee at the convention of
the Republican Party in Chicago in 1912, but he refused to
permit his name to be considered. After a personal interview
with Justice Hughes at Lake Placid, New York, Rabbi
Stephen S. Wise was quoted in the New York Tribune of
June 21, 1912, in part as follows: "He would decline the
nomination if tendered him. Why? The Supreme Court
must not be dragged into politics. A Judge of the Supreme
Court should not be available, though he be nominally eligible
for elective office. The moment he assumes the judicial office
he ceases to be a partisan and knows, or should know, no partisan obligation. The moment he accepts a party nomination,
one or more things happen and happen explicably."
But three years later, having succeeded in staving off the
nomination to the Presidency in 1912, if it may be expressed
in that way, the urge came in 1916, to Justice Hughes to become a candidate for President, and in view of the situation
as it then existed, he accepted the nomination and conducted
a vigorous campaign. His defeat for that office by Woodrow
Wilson, who received 277 electoral votes to Mr. Hughes' 254,
is a matter of history which does not need to be expanded upon
here. It is interesting to note that in the Senate fight on
Mr. Hughes' confirmation, his resignation from the Supreme
Court to accept the nomination for the Presidency was one
of the principal things urged by his opponents, and likewise
the question as to the ethics of his practicing before the Supreme Court during the interim was used strongly against
him. Was it right for Mr. Hughes to practice before the
Supreme Court after his retirement as a member of it? Was
it right for him to return and plead the cases of corporation
clients before the body of men with whom he had become inti-
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mately associated during his membership upon the Court?
The example of Chief Justice Taft himself was cited and it
was stated that he had established such a standard and such
a rule and precedent in ethics, when, upon his retirement from
the Presidency, he announced that he would not practice his
profession before the Supreme Court, because he had appointed a majority of the members of that body. Perhaps the cases
are not at all alike, but still a doubtful point of ethics is raised
in the comparison of the conduct of the two men, and it was
so urged by Mr. Hughes' opponents during the confirmation
debate. From 1917 to 1921, he was a member of the law firm
of Hughes, Round, Schuman and Dwight in New York City
and an immense quantity of important litigation was handled
by that firm, the services of Mr. Hughes being greatly in demand in those cases requiring argument before the Supreme
Court.
From 1921 to 1925, he served as Secretary of State under
President Harding and President Coolidge. His predecessor
in office, Colby, liked to be clever, whereas Hughes liked to be
clear. He had a program, and he knew that with the Senate
still bitter over Wilson and the League of Nations, he could
not hope to put this program through without public support.
This support he obtained through the newspapers. He talked
to the country daily, taking the people into his confidence as
far as he could. The editor of "Mirrors of Washington" said
of him, "He makes foreign relations hold front pages with
the Stillman Divorce Case." Secretary Hughes seemed to be
a wizard in the handling of the press during the time of the
Washington Arms Conference. As Secretary of State he set
his goal at the largest practical measure of international cooperation. He preached the doctrine of enlightened selfinterest. The interests of the United States after the war demanded that she abandon her policy of aloofness. His admirable-handling of the International Conference on the Limitations of Armaments, as its chairman, his persistent advocacy
of our entry into the World Court, his subsequent service on
that Court and his work in the interest of Pan-American
friendship were notable contributions to the cause of peace
and good will, and will place him as one of our greatest Secretaries of State. He emerged from the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in 1921 a world figure.
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He represented the United States as Commissioner Plenipotentiary at the Sixth International Conference of American
States at the City of Havana in February, 1928. Later in collaboration with Secretary Kellogg, he served at the memorable
Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration at Washington,
which resulted in the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration and the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, both of which were signed by the Plenipotentiaries
of 20 American nations. His competent labors, his scholarship, diplomacy and statesmanship were of the highest and
rarest kind and did much to aid in the highly successful outcome of these conferences. The result of the negotiations of
Mr. Hughes and Mr. Kellogg may be ultimately known in
history as the Pax-Americana. His admirable conduct of the
office during so critical a period in our history will unquestionably cause him to be ranked as one of the greatest among
our many distinguished Secretaries of State.
On May 1, 1929, he sailed from New York as Judge of
the Permanent Court of International Justice, commonly referred to as the World Court. Tributes were paid to him by
many leading Americans in such terms as "No worthier representative could be chosen," "A great lawyer, a great statesman,
a strong personality is called to a great opportunity," "The
beginning of a new and enlarged opportunity for distinguished
service" and "No better selection could have been made."
Prior to this, on January 25, 1929, the Bronx County Bar
Association had tendered Mr. Hughes a banquet at which the
Hon. William D. Guthrie, reviewed in most eloquent terms,
the life and service of the new appointee. That address is
to be found in the "American Bar Association Journal" for
May, 1929.
Now, with his appointment as Chief Justice of the United
States, an office which is second only to that of the Presidency,
Mr. Hughes enters a new period of service. It is a long way
from the days of the insurance investigation when he was
spoken of as "an example of the good man in politics", from
his other years as a teacher of Greek and Latin in the Delaware Academy at Delhi, N. Y., and a plodding professor of
law at Cornell and New York Universities, and the busy days
of his active practice at the bar. Mr. Hughes' career has
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been dramatic in the extreme. For more than 25 years he
has been in the spotlight, always "adequate to the exigency."
As a lawyer, he represents quite a contrast with the type
of advocate represented by William Pinkney and Rufus
Choate or the constitutional lawyer of the type of Webster,
Clay and Calhoun. He is the modern type of business lawyer,
clear, cool, logical, mathematical, capable of digesting immense quantities of business details, analyzing business policies and presenting them clearly to the courts. If Elihu Root
represents one of the first of the modern corporation type of
lawyers, capable of acting as Counsellor to business executives
in great combinations and merger movements, Mr. Hughes
is of the same type and perhaps even a more advanced type;
yet, withal, a man of broad viewpoint, with more of a flair
for public service, and of undertaking searching investigations
and involved matters of litigation which bring to the forefront his amazing analytical ability. Both in the interval
between his resignation from the Supreme Court and his taking office as Secretary of State and from the time he left that
position until this present appointment, the character of his
practice has been largely that of representing large business,
insurance and public utility corporations. From 1925 until
his appointment to the Supreme Court, he appeared in 54
cases before that body. The list of these cases was released for
publication by Senator Norris on February 8th, and presents
a formidable array of important cases decided or to be decided by the Supreme Court.
If we should like to know what manner of Chief Justice
he will make, it would be well to examine his previous record
on the Court. When Mr. Hughes went on the Supreme Court
in 1910 he was without any previous judicial experience. During the six years he served on that "more than Amphictyonic
Council," as William Pinkney long ago designated the Supreme Court in his argument in the Neriede Case, he wrote
150 opinions, including a half dozen dissenting opinions. Altogether he dissented 23 times. The task of the Supreme
Court during these latter years has been rather to clarify principles and to apply them to intricate problems of modern life
than to interpret the Constitution along broad lines. For the
most part, the Supreme Court in the last generation has been
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developing the due process clause as found in the 14th and
15th amendments to the Constitution and the Commerce
Clause, since, for the most part, the other clauses of the Constitution had previously been interpreted. We think of Marshall as having the most decisive weight in the interpretation
of the constitution, yet we are astonished by the fact that his
great constitutional opinions number only 42. It is quite
probable that the decisions rendered by Mr. Hughes during
the six years on the Supreme Court were of far more importance than those of Marshall. In 16 Columbia Law Review,
565 (1916), Arthur M. Allen gives an illuminating discussion of "The Opinions of Mr. Justice Hughes."
It is there pointed out that Justice Hughes' miscellaneous
legal opinions cover questions of admiralty, the rights of Indians, domestic relations, the jurisdiction of the courts, questions of practice and evidence, trusts and restraints of trade,
construction of statutes, trade-marks, copyrights, the customs
laws, riparian rights, patents, wills, bankruptcy, Pure Food
laws, the relation of master and servant and a variety of other
subjects. In many of these decisions most important property
and personal rights were involved.
It is also pointed out there that his constitutional opinions
cover a wide range comprising the interpretation of the 13th
Amendment in Bailey v. Alabama (1911) 219 U. S. 219; questions relating to the validity of state statutes fixing the liability
of the railroads as employers as in Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad v. McGuire (1911) 219 U. S. 549; the question of the right of the courts to compel the production of
documents in criminal cases in Wilson v. United States ('1911)
221 U. S. 361; questions involving the Interstate Commerce
Commission in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. The Interstate
Commerce Commission, (1911) 221 U. S. 612; the validity
of an eight hour law for women in Miller v. Wilson (1915)
236 U. S. 373; and double jeopardy in the case of Graham v.
West Virginia (1912) 224 U. S. 616.
Justice Hughes' greatest contributions to American constitutional law were made in a number of important cases
involving the relative powers of the states and the Federal
Government over intrastate commerce, and the questions relating to the rights of the states to regulate rates imposed
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by public service corporations. The most important of these
cases are the Minnesota Rate Cases (1913) 320 U. S. 352;
Houston & Texas Railroadv. United States (1914) 234 U. S.
342 and Northern Pacific Railway v. North Dakota (1915)
236 U. S. 585, which virtually took away from the state commissions the right to regulate intrastate rates.
The opinions of Justice Hughes failed to disclose any
expressions of his own personal economic views or any feeling
that the constitution itself needs to be sacredly guarded
against the encroachments of modern civilization. They show
a close concentration upon the facts of the particular case, an
entire suppression of personality, the lack of rhetorical devices of any kind and in their way are models of judicial expression. None of them shows anything but a purely impersonal and impartial discussion of the principles involved in
the instant case, yet in the Senate the fear was repeatedly expressed that his personal bias, his personal economic and
social views and his bias toward his clients would influence
his interpretation of the Constitution. It clearly appears from
his opinions that on the great questions affecting labor he was
at no time reactionary, but that he viewed such problems with
a broad and sane sympathy and it must be remembered that
he represented a labor union in the Coronado Case, after leaving the Court. Upon the trust question he has been in favor
of the "rule of reason", while in public utility valuation cases
he has been the leading advocate of the doctrine of the fixing
of rates on present values, that is, cost of reproduction, and
thus in line with the views of the majority of the Court, but
necessarily opposed to those of Justice Brandeis and Justice
Holmes. His decisions in these two fields will be watched
with the greatest interest.
His scholarly attainments are best represented by his discussion of the foundations, methods and achievements of the
United States Supreme Court published in 1928 as the
"Supreme Court of the United States," a series of lectures
which he delivered at Columbia University in 1927. This
book discusses the foundations of the Supreme Court, gives a
description of the Court at work, its organization and methods,
and its achievements in cementing the union. A very interesting phase of the book is his discussion of liberty, property and
social justice as interpreted by the Supreme Court. It is most

DICTA

interesting to have an interpretation of the work of the Court
by one who has served on the Court itself. His other published works are "Conditions of Progress in Democratic Government" (Yale Lectures) 1909 and "The Pathway of Peace
and Other Addresses," 1925.

Mr. Hughes is a fellow of Brown University, a Trustee
of the University of Chicago, and during the war, he served
as chairman of the Tariff Appeals Board for New York City.
In 1918 he was appointed by President Wilson as special
assistant to the Attorney-General in charge of the aircraft
inquiry.
He was President of the New York State Bar Association for 1917-18; President of the Legal Aid Society of New
York for 1917-19; President of the New York County Lawyers' Association 1919-20; and has always been active in
American Bar Association work and President of that Association in 1924, at the time of the pilgrimage of the American
lawyers to London. There he had the honor of delivering
an oration in Westminster Hall, the great hall of William
Rufus. His address made a profound impression on all who
heard it. Mr. Hughes spoke for the legal profession of the
United States before the dignitaries and leaders of the British,
Canadian and American Bars. As our representative and
spokesman, his eloquence rose to the occasion. He was thereafter elected and acclaimed an Honorary Bencher of the
Middle Temple. Following this he spoke on our behalf at
the Palace of Justice in Paris, to the French Bar, in lofty and
inspiring language.
From the foregoing it would appear that, notwithstanding the criticism and comment brought about by the appointment of Mr. Hughes to the office of Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, his distinguished career
symbolizes the highest and best standards and traditions of
the American Bar; that his preparedness, industry and competency, indeed his genius, have been demonstrated in the varied private and public services of his life; that his eminent
qualifications for the position, his splendid talents and his
brilliant successes in the past, all augur well that he will fill
with honor the lofty position held in the past by Marshall
and Taney, by Waite and Fuller and White and by his immediate predecessor, the late William Howard Taft.
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event of the filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
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AND ERROR-BILL OF EXCEPTIONS-No. 12373Employers Fire Insurance Company vs. Bartee-Decided
February 24, 1930.
Facts.-The company insured Bartee against loss from
theft of his automobile. Bartee filed a complaint alleging
that his car was stolen and wrecked, and in due course had a
verdict against the Company. After the case was lodged in
this court Bartee moved to strike the bill of exceptions, which
was done. Pending this motion the Company filed its brief
on application for a supersedeas and asked for a decision
on the merits.
Held.-The only question worth considering, that is
whether "theft" includes borrowing with intent to return, is
excluded through the striking of the bill of exceptions.
Judgmen't Affirmed.
APPEAL

ATTORNEYS-

DISBARMENT-

INDEFINITE SUSPENSION-NO.

125 15-People v. Kelley-Decided Feb. 10, 1930.
Facts.-This was an original proceeding in the Supreme
Court against one Kelley for abuse of his privileges and a
violation of his trust as an attorney and officer of this Court.
A dispute arose between one McCune and one Hower concerning the possession of certain personal property. A legal remedy existed for the settlement of that question. Kelley, representing McCune, attempted to intimidate Hower and twice
threatened him with criminal prosecution. These tactics
failing, he obtained police assurance that he might resort
EEDITOR'S COMMENT: This issue marks a departure in the conduct of this department of Dicta. Hitherto abstracts of decisions have not been printed until the lapse
of the time within which a petition for rehearing might be filed or until such petition,
if filed, had been disposed of. In future, such abstracts will be published in the issue
next appearing after rendition of the decision. Thus the abstracts are not in a strict
sense final. Any withdrawal or modification of any opinion resulting from a petition
for rehearing will, however, be duly noted in subsequent digests.
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to force without interference. Thereupon he broke down the
door, took possession, and held possession of an office room
over night. Kelley's threats rendered him liable to a fine of
$500 and six months' imprisonment.
Held.-The judgment of the Court is that respondent be
indefinitely suspended from the practice of his profession.
Mr. Chief Justice Whitford and Mr. Justice Butler concurred
in part and dissented in part.
ATTRNEYS-DISBARMENT-SUSPENSION-NO.

12519-Peo-

ple v. Ginsberg-DecidedFeb. 17, 1930.
Facts.-Original proceedings brought in the Supreme
Court on relation of The Colorado Bar Association against
Ginsberg to disbar him from practicing as an attorney or
otherwise discipline him. The original petition contained
four charges.
Held.-1. For a lawyer to advertise for claims against
others, whether they are in financial difficulties or not, tends
to bring reproach on the legal profession. Such conduct is
grossly unethical.
2. A lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting.
3. The position of an attorney as attorney for the Receiver of a defunct concern and as a private speculator in
its securities is wholly inconsistent.
4. Attention is called to the seventeenth canon of ethics.
Judgment of Suspension for One Year.
CONTRACTS-

REPURCHASE

AGREEMENT-

CHATTEL

MORT-

GAGE-AGENCY-No. 12277-InternationalTrust Company

v. Stearns Investment Company, et al.-Decided January
27,1930.
Facts.-The Court below sustained a general demurrer
to the complaint, and the plaintiff elected to stand on the complaint. The Water Company, the Investment Company, and
the Securities Company were allied and interrelated corporations with interlocking offices and directors.
The Investment Company sold to the International Trust
Company a promissory note executed by the Land Company
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to secure a Deed of Trust, and the Investment Company
agreed "upon request to re-purchase this loan * * * at any
time on sixty days' notice at par and accrued interest." When
demand was made for a repurchase, the Investment Company
was hopelessly insolvent and was unable to re-purchase.
Held.-The Investment Company was under no contractual obligation to repurchase the note, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that had demand been made before
it became insolvent, it would not have repurchased it. Faced
with the possibility of again becoming the owner of the note,
its action in protecting its interest by purchasing the property
at tax sale, thus preventing its purchase by a stranger was the
exercise of ordinary business prudence. No contractual right
of the Trust Company was violated by the transaction. Under
the agreement the Trust Company had the right to return the
note and receive the amount of the principal of the note, with
interest thereon; that, and nothing more. It received that
amount when at the foreclosure sale it bought the property
for the full amount of the principal indebtedness, interest,
costs, and expenses of sale. The demurrer was properly sustained.
Judgment Affirmed.
CONTRACTS -ACCEPTANCE

-

COUNTERCLAIM -AMENDMENT

No. 12344-Rugby Coal Company v. Interstate Fuel Company-Decided February17, 1930.
Facts.-The Interstate Fuel Company had judgment below against the Rugby Coal Company for balance due for
coal delivered. The Coal Company admitted the delivery of
the coal and the balance due, but sought by counterclaim to
recover damages occasioned by loss of profits arising out of
a breach of an alleged contract between the parties by reason
of certain letters. The offer of sale was made by letter, and in
the alleged acceptance letter, the acceptance was made, but
with certain modifications.
Held.-1. The modification of the Fuel Company's offer was substantial and material and effectually operates as
a refusal to accept the Fuel Company's offer, and constitutes
a counter offer to the Fuel Company, which the record dis-
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closes was, in fact, never accepted. The minds of the parties
never met upon the exact terms and conditions of the contemplated agreement set forth in the counterclaim, and therefore
no enforceable contract was consummated.
2. The first application for leave to amend the counterclaim appears in the brief of the Coal Company in support of
its motion for a new trial. Such request came too late, and it
was not error for the Court to deny such request.
Judgment Affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-

AGGRAVATED ROBBERY-

EVIDENCE -

No.

12334-Bunch v. People-DecidedJanuary 20, 1930.
Facts.-Bunch was sentenced for a term of fifteen to
eighteen years on a verdict of aggravated robbery. The only
assignments argued are: 1-The insufficiency of the evidence; 2-The giving of instruction No. 4.
Held.-Evidence sufficient. Corpus delicti may be made
by circumstantial evidence. Rule requiring corroboration of
a confession is met if the additional evidence is sufficient to
convince the jury that the crime charged is real and not imaginary. Instructions not erroneous.
Judgment Affirmed.
12426-King v.
People-DecidedJan. 20, 1930.
Facts.-FariceKing was found guilty of murder in the
first degree. Her defense was "not guilty by reason of insanity."
Held.-First: The evidence did not raise a reasonable
doubt as to defendant's sanity, and the determination on this
point by the jury was final.
Second: The Court did not err in refusing inspection
of letters.
Third: Photograph of deceased taken immediately after
shooting was properly admitted.
Fourth: Lower Court's treatment of attorney for defendant not prejudicial.
Judgment Affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-INSANITY-NO.
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LAW-MURDER-SUFFICIENCY

OF

EVIDENCE-

LEADING QUESTIONS-NO. 12418-Weiss v. People-De-

cided February3,1930.
Facts.-Weiss was convicted of murder in the first degree
for killing his wife and sentenced to be hanged. At the time
of the homicide Weiss was seen running at full speed in pursuit of his fleeing wife out on the street with a gun in his hand
and when within eight feet of her, he shot her in the back of
the neck severing the spinal cord from which she died.
Held.-l. On a charge of murder, a trial by jury is imperative. In the instant case, the jury has passed upon the
credibility of the witnesses and determined the weight of the
evidence, and having found the facts against the defendant
and the evidence as a whole being sufficient, the verdict of
the jury cannot be disturbed.
2. Where the State is taken by surprise in one of its witnesses, it is proper under such circumstances for the State to
be permitted to cross examine this witness.
3. Improper questions asked of the defendant by the
State on cross-examination where the objection to the question
is sustained and the Court later instructs the jury not to consider evidence rejected by the Court is not sufficient to constitute reversible error.
Judgment Affirmed.
12464-Massachusetts Protective
Association, Inc. v. Daugherty-DecidedJanuary 13, 1930.
Facts.-Daughertyrecovered judgment on an insurance

INSURANCE-SUICIDE-NO.

policy which contained a clause insuring against any loss resulting from bodily injuries effected by accidental means, but

excluding self-destruction while sane or insane. The insured
committed suicide after the policy had been in force more
than a year. No notice was served upon the insurance company of the claim until about two years after the death.
Held.-I. Where a person commits suicide while insane,
the death is an accident.
2. Under the Statutes of Colorado, the suicide of a policy holder after the first policy year is not a defense against
the payment of the life insurance policy.

DICTA

3. Where the policy provided for immediate notice of
the claim of the company, yet under the circumstances of this
case where the policy itself expressly said the company would
not be liable in the event that the insured committed suicide,
this was sufficient excuse for a delay in making the claim; and
further, the very fact that the company put this in this policy
was, in effect, a denial of the claim in advance and inured to
the benefit of the beneficiary.
Judgment Affirmed.
MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-

DAMAGES-

DEFECTIVE MAN-

12303Peek v. City of Lamar-DecidedFeb. 17, 1930.
Facts.-Action by Peek for personal injuries alleged to
have been sustained through negligence of the City in permitting a manhole of a storm sewer in one of its streets to remain for a long time in a defective and dangerous condition.
General demurrer was sustained by the trial court. Plaintiff
elected to stand on the amended complaint and the ruling of
the trial court sustaining the demurrer. No written notice
was served by the plaintiff upon the City in regard to his alleged injuries within 90 days, as provided in Section 9157,
Compiled Laws of 1921.
Held.-In an action against a municipal corporation, to
recover damages for an injury resulting from defective streets,
the complaint must show that the written notice required by
statute has been given, or it fails to state a cause of action.
Judgment Affirmed.
HOLE-FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE OF CLAIM-No.

MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS-

FRANCHISE-ELECTIONS--No.

12452-Inland Utilities Company, et al. v. Schell, et al.Decided January 6, 1930.
Facts.-The town of Burlington, Colorado, an incorporated municipal corporation, was the owner of its electric light
plant and also its water plant, which were used in connection with each other. It attempted to pass an ordinance selling its electric light plant to private parties and to grant a
twenty-five year franchise without the parties applying for
the franchise, advertising that an application would be made
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to the town council for a franchise as provided in sections
9172 and 9173 by the Compiled Laws of 1921 and later an
election was held in attempting to ratify the sale of the electric
light plant.
Held.-The pleadings affirmatively showing that no publication was made of the application for a franchise to operate
an electric light plant as provided for in section 9173 of the
Compiled Laws of 1921 the lower Court was right granting
an injunction enjoining the sale of the electric light plant and
the granting of the franchise.
Judgment Affirmed.
PAYMENT-APPROPRIATION-JUDGMENT-SUBPOENA

DUCES

TECUM-No. 12053-Armour & Company et al v. McPhee
& McGinnity Company-Decided February17, 1930.
Facts.-While case was pending in Supreme Court, trial
court requested that claim of one, Vosmer, whose lien had been
established, be remitted to the trial court for further investigation because of a showing that had been made indicating
misconduct on the part of Vosmer, which caused improper
judgment in his favor. Hearing was had on Vosmer's claim,
court found that he had testified falsely and that he had failed
to produce records required by subpoena duces tecum, and
adjudged him guilty of contempt and ordered him confined in
the County jail for a period of thirty days.
Held.-1. Vosmer failed to comply with the subpoena
duces tecum.
2. The Court did not err in vacating the judgment which
had been rendered in favor of Vosmer at the time of the first
trial and in entering judgment in favor of Armour and Company, dismissing Vosmer's claim of lien.
3. While a creditor is not obliged to make an application immediately the payment is made, still where he does
apply the payment in a particular way, he is bound by his
act and cannot afterwards change the application without the
consent of the debtor.
4. While a creditor has the right to apply a general
payment made, to any account which it may have against the
debtor, when no application is made by the debtor himself, yet
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this must be done at the time and before any controversy
arises. It is too late to make application of payments while
preparing for suit or after the suit is instituted.
Judgment Affirmed.
PRACTICE

AND

PROCEDURE-MISTRIAL-WITHDRAWAL

OF

COMPLAINT-MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-NO. 11973-Reagan v. Dyrenforth, et al.-Decided February 24, 1930.
Facts.-This writ of error is to review a judgment of the
Denver district court for $15,000.00 in favor of plaintiffs
below (defendants here) for malicious prosecution. The defendant below and plaintiffs below are owners respectively
of adjoining mining claims, and have been engaged in litigation for many years in various courts. Plaintiffs began an
action against defendant in this case in the district court of
Gunnison County for damages for malicious prosecution. On
October 5, 1925, a jury was sworn, and thereupon, defendant
moved for judgment on the pleadings. The court refused to
enter this judgment, but granted plaintiff's request that a juror
be withdrawn, a mistrial directed, and that he be given 30
days in which to file a new complaint so that the case might
be ready for trial at the April term of the court. The new
complaint was not filed in 30 days, but a new action (the
present one) was commenced over eight months later in the
Denver district court. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss
this action, which the trial court overruled.
Held.-The action should have been dismissed. The trial
in the district court of Gunnison County having commenced,
the plaintiffs did not have an absolute right to withdraw their
complaint, but only as and on such terms as the trial court,
in its sound discretion might order. The court, in effect, imposed the terms that plaintiffs should file a new complaint in
the same court within 30 days. These conditions were not
complied with, and plaintiffs could not seek another forum for
their action.
Butler J. dissents.
Judgment Reversed and Case Remanded.

DICTA

12255-Cadwell
v. Dunfee, et al.-DecidedFebruary 24, 1930.
Facts.-Cadwellsued Dunfee and Mink for damages for
their interference with his alleged "way of necessity" through
their land. At the trial, plaintiff waived the claim of statutory "way of necessity", and consented that the case be tried
on the existence of an alleged independent agreement. The
trial court found no agreement.
Held.-The claim under the statute was waived at the
trial and cannot be pressed here. There was no conflicting
evidence about the alleged agreement, and the finding of the
trial court must stand.
Judgment Affirmed.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-WAIVER-NO.
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